Introduction
The exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in criminal trials is a subject that frequently evokes a conflict between two equally important societal views. Crime control protagonists are repulsed by the acquittal of those who are factually guilty.
They contend that society pays an excessive price when an accused is acquitted for the reason that unconstitutionally obtained evidence, crucial for a conviction on a serious charge, has been excluded. The social costs of exclusion are great under these circumstances, because a person who is factually guilty has not been brought to book. By contrast, fundamental rights advocates frown upon a conviction based on evidence procured by police conduct that unlawfully encroaches upon the constitutional rights of accused persons. In other words, there is a tension between the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system and the protection of fundamental rights. The South African exclusionary rule was designed to strike a balance between these countervailing societal interests. first group of factors (trial fairness) is considered during the first leg of the admissibility assessment. 17 The first leg of the assessment relates to the phrase "[e]vidence … must be excluded if its admission would render the trial unfair". This assessment is concerned with the effect that admission of the disputed evidence would have on the fairness of the trial. During the first leg of the assessment the public interest in protecting the rights of the accused is the key concern. 18 This leg of the admissibility assessment is not explored in this article.
19
The second leg of the admissibility analysis relates to the phrase "would be detrimental to the administration of justice". 20 The second and third groups of factors are evaluated during this leg of the admissibility assessment. 21 The second group of factors is concerned with the seriousness of the constitutional infringement, 22 and the third group of factors deals with the effect that exclusion may have on the integrity of the administration of justice. 23 In this contribution, I explore the third group of factors (also known as the "effect of exclusion on the integrity of the criminal justice system" or an assessment of the "costs of exclusion"). In doing so I wish to join a number of 
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As said before, based on R v Collins, 25 the relevant factors considered under the third group of factors are the "seriousness of the charges faced by the accused" and the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction". An important issue that arises when this group of factors is considered is if the reliability of the evidence (particularly real evidence) and its significance in proving factual guilt should play a prominent role in the assessment. Given that the third group of factors is concerned with the public interest in crime control, it has been suggested that public opinion should be a weighty factor when this group of factors is considered. 26 It is against this background that this contribution poses the following three questions: firstly, if the "current mood" of society should be accorded much weight when this group of factors is weighed and balanced against the other relevant factors during the admissibility assessment; secondly, if a consideration of the "seriousness of the charge" and "the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction" could possibly encroach upon the presumption of innocence; 27 and, finally, if factual guilt should be allowed to tilt the scales in favour of the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence if the evidence is essential for a conviction on a serious charge?
It is important to note that an admissibility assessment under section 35(5) is considered during a trial-within-a-trial. 28 Nevertheless, the practice has recently developed that an accused may challenge the admissibility of evidence by means of a pre-trial motion on the grounds that a warrant authorising the search and seizure of evidence be declared invalid 29 or that a provision contained in an Act of Parliament, authorising the issue and execution of a search warrant be declared This article is presented in three parts. The introduction (part 1) is followed by a discussion of the effect of exclusion on the integrity of criminal justice (also known as the third group of Collins factors) in part two. The discussion in part two is subdivided into three parts. It starts off by asking if the "current mood" of society should play a role in the admissibility assessment and, if so, should considerable weight be attached to it? Secondly, the "seriousness of the charge faced by the accused" is discussed, and thirdly, the "importance of the evidence in order to secure a conviction" is explored. This is followed by a short conclusion in part three, where a recommendation is made in regard to the assessment of the third group of factors.
2
The effect of exclusion on the integrity of the criminal justice system (the social costs of exclusion) Ally 2010 SALJ 712-723 . However, compare the approach followed in S v Mkhize 2011 1 SACR 554 (KZD) para 51, where Govindasamy AJ applied an approach based on the "automatic" exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence when he reasoned as follows: "I am in agreement with the learned Patel J in Viljoen's case: there is no discretion afforded to a judicial officer when he/she is confronted with a situation where evidence is obtained unconstitutionally. To admit such evidence, contaminated as it is, will be a violation of the accused's rights, and, above all, will be prejudicial to the administration of justice."
Should public opinion play a role in determining whether the exclusion or the admission of the disputed evidence could result in "detriment" to the administration of justice?
If so, what weight should be attached to it? These issues are addressed below.
2.1
The "current public mood" of society or public opinion
33
The Constitutional Court was called upon in S v Makwanyane 34 to determine the relevance and weight to be attached to public opinion when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Chaskalson P held that public opinion does play a role when interpreting the Constitution, but courts should not be slaves to it. 35 In his often-quoted statement on this issue, Chaskalson P was prepared to assume that the majority of South Africans are in favour of the retention of the death penalty, and continued by demarcating the impact of public opinion when interpreting a constitutional provision as follows:
36
Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights could then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is answerable to the public for the way its mandate is exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order established by the 1993 Constitution.
It should be emphasised that Chaskalson P discussed the task of public opinion not only in relation to the constitutionality of the death penalty, but also with the intention of providing guidance with regard to the interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Not that a court will allow public opinion to dictate its decision (S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 431C-F). The court should in fact endeavour to educate the public to accept that a fair trial means a constitutional trial, and vice versa. … It is therefore the duty of the courts in their everyday activity to carry the message to the public that the Constitution is not a set of high-minded values designed to protect criminals from their just deserts; but is in fact a shield which protects all citizens from official abuse. They must understand that for the courts to tolerate invasion of the rights of even the most heinous criminal would diminish their constitutional rights. In other words, the courts should not merely have regard to public opinion, but should mould people's thinking to accept constitutional norms using plain language understandable to the common man. African section 35(5) jurisprudence is the remark by Erasmus J that admissibility rulings should not be premised on public opinion.
Furthermore, there appears to be no convincing reason why the prudent approach adopted by Lamer J, in R v Collins, 59 to the effect that the courts are customarily the only "effective shelter for individuals and unpopular minorities", 60 should not be applicable to South African courts 61 when "detriment to the administration of justice"
has to be determined under section 35(5). The provisions of section 35 (5) para 88, where he reasoned that: "The very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for vesting the power of judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic process. Those entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and marginalized people of our society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst and the weakest amongst us, that all of us can be secure that our own rights will be protected".
opposite result, which would be detrimental to the administration of justice. This argument is further fortified by the supremacy clause, 63 which dictates that the Constitution shall be the supreme law in South Africa. Consequently, in the event that public opinion is in conflict with the provisions and objectives sought to be advanced by the Constitution, the latter must surely prevail.
64
Additionally, the undue emphasis on public opinion during the assessment of the third group of factors may disturb the very nature of the section 35(5) discretion. It could provide judges with the latitude to determine the admissibility issue based on their subjective views of the "current mood" of society. In such circumstances the possibility remains that the purposes sought to be achieved by section 35 (5) , where the court dealt with the function of public opinion and its role in the admissibility assessment when the charges are of a serious nature, as follows: "At the time of delivery of this judgment it is, I think, fair to say that there is a widespread public perception that crime is on the increase … I venture to suggest that a public opinion poll would probably show that a majority of our population would at this stage of the history of our country be quite content if the courts allow evidence at a criminal trial, even if it was unconstitutionally obtained". Furthermore, Froneman J, in S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 352, was mindful of the fact that the "current public mood" of the public towards unconstitutionally obtained evidence favoured the admissibility inquiry, provided that the "current mood" of society could not be characterised as unreasonable. 70 What could be categorised as unreasonable
should not be left to the all-encompassing discretion of the presiding officer. 71 A presiding officer should always be mindful of the fact that he or she is interpreting a constitutional provision and his or her decision should therefore demonstrate that due regard has been given to the values that underpin the Constitution.
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More importantly, an over-emphasis on public opinion would necessarily imply that a consideration of the long-term effect that the regular admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would have on the integrity of the justice system would be relegated to an insignificant concern, especially when the evidence was important for a conviction on a serious charge.
In what follows, attention is paid to two factors which comprise the third group of factors. As stated before, these factors are the "seriousness of the charge" and the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction". 73 inclusion of evidence, but declined to be bound by such public attitudes, and observed as follows: "It is true that courts should hold themselves accountable to the public, but that does not mean that they should seek public popularity". 74 Ally 2010 SALJ 704-705 discusses the Canadian approach to this group of factors. The courts of Canada have been reluctant to apply this group of factors (the "seriousness of the charge" and "the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction") prior to the decision in R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC). In the Grant decision paras 79-84, the Supreme Court of Canada preferred to discuss the third group of factors under the heading "Society's interest in an adjudication on the merits". Three factors are considered under this line of inquiry: firstly, the reliability of the evidence; secondly, the importance of the evidence for the prosecution's case. However, this factor is relevant in a very limited sense -the exclusion of relevant, reliable evidence would have a more negative impact on the justice system where the exclusion in effect destroys the prosecution's case. A third factor is the seriousness of the offence. This factor is neutral: the failure to prosecute a serious charge may have an immediate negative effect on how society views the criminal justice system. However, the public must rest assured that, despite the seriousness of the charge, the courts do take rights-protection seriously. In other words, the short-term public outrage at the lack of a conviction does not mean that the judge must ignore the long-term integrity of the justice system. 86 Froneman J observed that a public opinion poll would have suggested that the evidence should nevertheless be admitted, despite the seriousness of the constitutional violations. However, after the judge gave due consideration to the presumption of innocence, the evidence was excluded. 87 Froneman J based his decision on "the longer term purpose of the Constitution, to establish a democratic order based on, amongst others, the recognition of basic human rights". 88 The court made its admissibility ruling while emphasising that it was not bound by the "current mood" of society. In terms of this point of view, admission or exclusion hinges on a balance between the truth-seeking function of the courts and the preservation of the constitutional directive contained in section 35 (5), that courts have a duty to safeguard the integrity of the justice system.
However, the perception should not be created that the more serious the charges, the lesser the protection accorded to an accused should be. Correspondingly, the courts should not be more amenable to exclude evidence when the charges are regarded as less serious. 89 The potential harmful effect of such an approach on the integrity of the criminal justice system is instantly recognisable. It is agreed with Stuart who argues that the Ontario Court of Appeal erred in R v Grant 90 by adopting the philosophy that the more serious the offence charged, the greater the probability that the administration of justice will be brought into disrepute by the exclusion of evidence which is important to secure a conviction, because this approach implies … the public interest in admitting evidence varies directly with the gravity of the offence. The more serious the offence, the more likely it is that the public interest requires the admission of the evidence.
These rigid approaches suggest that the seriousness of the charges should be an influential factor in the admissibility assessment. In my view, this approach implies that the less serious the charge faced by the accused, the greater constitutional protection should be accorded to him or her. Equally, the more serious the charge, the less likely it is that the evidence would be excluded. 93 This inflexible line of reasoning should not be determinative of the admissibility assessment. Such an approach implies that an accused may not rely on the presumption of innocence merely because the prosecution alleges that he or she has committed a serious offence. Differently put, the remedy contained in section 35(5) would be rendered superfluous if the accused faces a serious charge. 94 Stuart 95 highlighted the danger of this approach in heads of argument filed in the appeal of R v Grant. 96 In addition, such an approach flies in the face of the constitutional value of equal protection before the law and equal benefit of the law. 97 More to the point, it would offend the integrity of the justice system, and should primarily for this reason not be followed by the South African courts when this group of factors is considered. While society has a greater interest in seeing a serious offence prosecuted, it has an equivalent interest in ensuring that the judicial system is above reproach, particularly when the stakes are high.
This dictum conveys the clear message that the purpose sought to be advanced by the exclusionary rule is ultimately a significant factor in the admissibility assessment.
Put in another way, it would -depending on the circumstances of each case -be appropriate to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence which links the accused to serious charges if the admission of such evidence would be harmful to the integrity of the administration of justice. Against this background, the approach followed in S v Melani 103 seems to be correct: even if the public has a crucial interest in a successful prosecution when the accused faces a serious charge, our courts should be mindful of the fact that they have been entrusted with the responsibility of upholding the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. In my view, the Bill of Rights has been designed to protect the "worst and the weakest amongst us" from the heightened public interest in securing a conviction when an accused faces a serious charge. 104 Differently put, the short-term public outcry when an accused facing a serious charge is acquitted because unconstitutionally obtained evidence that is relating to this factor be applied by the courts of South Africa? Furthermore, is it possible to determine how important the evidence is for a successful prosecution without encroaching upon the presumption of innocence?
It is in the interests of the prosecution to demonstrate that the disputed evidence is essential for a conviction and that it should for that reason be received by the court.
In other words, the prosecution must present evidence that suggests that the costs of exclusion would be high. Since the costs of exclusion would be high the prosecution would be entitled to argue that such evidence should be received rather than excluded because exclusion would, under the circumstances, be "detrimental"
to the administration of justice. However, the importance of an impugned confession, effectively insulates the presumption of innocence from encroachment when the admissibility of testimonial evidence is the subject of the admissibility dispute.
The Lebone decision confirms the position in South African law that the prosecution may not lead evidence that discloses the contents of the disputed incriminating testimonial evidence unless the accused challenges its admissibility on the basis that the information therein contained is fabricated or that it originates from another source. 112 The prosecution may therefore not introduce evidence relating to the contents of the testimonial evidence obtained after a constitutional infringement, even in section 35 (5) Nevertheless, a court should, when making the section 35 (5) Die Handves van Menseregte in Hoofstuk 3 van die Grondwet beliggaam, is juis, onder andere, daarop gerig om die individu teen magsmisbruik deur owerheidsorgane te beskerm en 'n erodering daarvan behoort, myns insiens, gedoog te word slegs waar die belangrikheid van die teenbelang wat deur die miskenning bevorder kan word vir dwingende redes so 'n afwyking regverdig. Die onderhawige is, myns insiens, nie so 'n geval nie, omdat dit nie moontlik is om vanuit die getuienis wat in die binneverhoor aangebied is die wesenlikheid van die items waarop beslag gelê is, in die vervolging van die beskuldigdes te bepaal nie.
Although this decision was delivered prior to the enactment of section 35 (5), and despite the fact that the evidence in dispute was real evidence, its relevance is clear: the court considered "the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction". It also confirms the difficulty faced by the prosecution in presenting evidence, during a trial- within-a-trial, which may persuade a court that relevant evidence should be received in the face of a constitutional infringement, because it is important to secure a conviction of the accused.
The difficulty in making an assessment of the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction" became obvious in the decisions of S v Shongwe 122 and the minority opinion in Pillay v S. 123 The Shongwe decision is briefly explored first, followed by a short discussion of the minority decision in Pillay. The accused in the Shongwe case faced serious charges. The accused was not informed about the right to legal representation, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining silent before he made a pointing-out and confessed to committing the crime. Whether the admission of the evidence and the resultant conviction of accused 10 would be detrimental to the administration of justice involves, I think, an inquiry whether an acquittal would be likely to bring about a loss of respect for the judicial process in the eyes of reasonable and dispassionate members of society and, conversely, whether a conviction would be likely to result in a loss of respect for the Bill of Rights (emphasis added).
This factor has been construed to entail that our courts must consider what effect either the admission or exclusion of the disputed evidence would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system. The concern with such an analysis is that, in order to give effect to this inquiry, our courts must consider what impact their admissibility rulings (either admission or exclusion) would have on the outcomes (a conviction or an acquittal) in the cases before them. Such an assessment links admissibility to criminal culpability. Thus, if the issue of admissibility is closely tied to the criminal culpability of the accused, such an approach might be frowned upon by fundamental rights protagonists, since it implicitly promotes the erosion of the presumption of innocence.
128 Such an approach implies that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be readily admitted in the event that the accused is adjudged to be factually guilty. Taken to its logical conclusion, evidence should regularly be excluded when the accused is likely to be acquitted. 129 Surely, this could not have been the purpose sought to be advanced by section 35(5). If this were the case, the rationale for the existence of the constitutional provision would be defeated.
It is not suggested that the blame for this approach lay at the doorstep of the judge in the Shongwe decision and that of the minority opinion in Pillay. On the contrary, I
would offer the opinion that this difficulty is intrinsically linked to the nature of the in behaving as they did, ie charging accused 10 in spite of the undertaking, and the courts sanctioning such behaviour, the objective referred to will in future be well nigh impossible to achieve". The danger inherent in such an approach is that it might create the perception that our courts do not have a high regard for the constitutional rights guaranteed in the right to legal representation and his right to remain silent were infringed. After a discoverability analysis the court held that the admission of the disputed evidence would not only render his trial unfair, but its admission would also be detrimental to the administration of justice. As a result, real evidence, essential for convictions on serious charges (and which linked the accused to such charges) was excluded. Bill of Rights. The Mkhize judgment seemingly failed to take into account that an admissibility ruling should be focussed not only on that particular case, but that courts should also consider what effect the regular admission of evidence obtained in such a manner would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system.
146
To summarise, the majority judgment in Pillay v S 147 appropriately conveys the message that the costs of exclusion should not be determinative of the outcome of the admissibility assessment. The opposing approach implies that reliable real evidence essential for a conviction on serious charges would be more readily admitted. The admission of the disputed evidence under these circumstances would evidently find public support, especially when South Africans are enduring high levels of serious crime. 148 Such an approach is also strongly associated with the common law inclusionary rule. It is submitted that section 35(5) implicitly overrules this common law practice.
149

Conclusion
The high rate of serious crime in South Africa should not be considered as a factor that unduly tilts the scales in favour of the admission of the disputed evidence. South
African courts should be wary not to convey the message to society that the ends of crime control justify the use of unconstitutional means. Such an approach would be tantamount to informing members of society at large that their rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are not of any value for the reason that the high rate of serious crime in South Africa does not show any signs of decline. 150 This implies that South
Africans should accept that what the Constitution guarantees should not be taken seriously.
The "current mood" of society does matter in the section 35(5) assessment. This is common cause between both due process protagonists and those in favour of crime control values. The differences emerge when one has to determine the weight that should be attached to the "current mood" of society. African decisions are incompatible with regard to the weight that should be attached to public opinion. 154 The guidance of the Constitutional Court on this important issue is awaited.
Section 35(5) enjoins South African courts not to be swayed by the pressures of public opinion but to assure all South Africans -regardless of the fact that they are accused of having committed the most heinous crimes and no matter if the likelihood is great that they actually committed such crimes -that the goals of crime control do not justify unconstitutional police conduct. Instead, the goal of preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system is of paramount importance in section 35 (5) challenges. 155 It is submitted that, while the "current public mood" of society may be a relevant consideration in the admissibility assessment, it should not replace the fundamental duty of South African courts to "uphold and protect the Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it", and to administer justice to "all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law".
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The presumption of innocence deserves particular protection in a constitutional democracy based on human dignity, freedom and equality, even when the evidence is essential to convict an accused facing serious charges. For this reason the admissibility inquiry must be isolated from the assessment of factual guilt. Court of Appeal, confirmed this contention in the following terms: "… the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice". 156 The oath taken by judges when they take office, contained in item 6 of Schedule 2 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the fact that the accused is factually guilty should not be determinative of the admissibility assessment. Contrary to the approach followed by the minority opinion in Pillay v S, 157 it is suggested that the admissibility issue should not, in order to protect the presumption of innocence, be closely linked to criminal culpability. 158 In my view the nature of the assessment seems to be the reason why this approach was followed by the minority opinion in the Pillay decision.
In the light hereof it is suggested that our courts should rather focus on the "reliability of the evidence" (or the nature of the evidence) and the seriousness of the charge faced by the accused when assessing the third group of factors. This does not mean that the factor of the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction" should be totally disregarded. The reliability of the evidence is a key factor when determining the importance of the evidence for a successful prosecution. Cromwell J explained why this is the case, in R v Côté, when he reasoned that when a conviction is based on unreliable evidence, the admission of such evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute; by contrast, the exclusion of reliable evidence may impact negatively on the truth-seeking role of the criminal justice system when such an exclusion destroys the prosecution's case. 159 From this point of view, the assessment of the importance of the evidence for the prosecution hinges on the reliability of the evidence.
It is further suggested that the reliability of the evidence should be a key consideration (among others) under the third group of factors for the following reasons. 160 First, the assessment of the suggested factor will overcome the difficulty (as argued above) experienced by our courts when they assess the "importance of the evidence for a conviction". In other words, the implicit erosion of the presumption of innocence will be avoided. Secondly, the suggested refocusing on the reliability of the evidence is not at odds with an assessment of the public interest in crime control and the integrity of the criminal justice system. In contrast, such interests are placed within their proper context when the reliability of the evidence is considered a key factor. Thirdly, the suggested focus on the reliability of the evidence will, from a purely pragmatic point of view, markedly decrease the difficulty experienced by the prosecution when presenting evidence about the costs of exclusion. Finally, an assessment of the reliability of the evidence is strongly aligned to the values which section 35(5) seeks to enhance, since the admission of unreliable evidence in order to secure a conviction on a serious charge would unquestionably be detrimental to the administration of justice 161 and would also impact negatively on the societal interest in ensuring that an accused should not be subjected to an unfair trial.
162
The seriousness of the charge faced by an accused is one of the important factors that must be considered in admissibility challenges, but it should not be allowed to overshadow the other factors that a court has to weigh and balance in admissibility challenges. It cannot be denied that society has a heightened interest in ensuring that those who face serious charges (and who are factually guilty) be convicted.
Likewise, it cannot be disputed that society has a corresponding concern in safeguarding the constitutional rights of those accused of having allegedly committed the most atrocious crimes. In the light hereof it would be appropriate to assess the seriousness of the charges faced by the accused while having due regard to the duty of the courts to defend the integrity of the justice system. admissibility rulings. 164 Evidence crucial for successful prosecutions on serious charges has in a number of cases been excluded in order to achieve the goal of preventing judicial contamination, while also complying with the directive of section 35(5) , that is, the prevention of disrepute befalling the administration of criminal justice. 165 This seems to be the correct approach, since the regular excuse of unconstitutional police conduct that the evidence is essential for a conviction on serious charges would only revive the public perception (which existed before 1994) 166 that the police are above the law. 
Register of legislation
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (as amended)
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1986
Register of case law factors must be considered to assess whether unconstitutionally obtained evidence should either be excluded or admitted. This contribution is focussed on the third group of factors (also known as the "effect of exclusion", or the "social costs of exclusion") which consists of the "seriousness of the charge faced by the accused", and the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction". This group of factors is concerned with the public interest in crime control. Some scholars argue that the "public mood" should be a weighty factor when our courts consider this group of factors.
Against this background this article considers three issues: First, whether considerable weight should be attached to the "current mood" of society when our courts weigh and balance this group of factors against other relevant factors;
secondly, whether a consideration of the "seriousness of the charge" and the "importance of the evidence for a successful prosecution" could possibly encroach upon the presumption of innocence; and, thirdly, whether factual guilt should be allowed to tip the scales in favour of the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence when the evidence is crucial for a conviction on a serious charge. 
